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State Bar Associations and Attorney Online
Speech: Punishment Without
Proper Guidance
Mary Lamar W. Nicholas*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are an attorney who just spent the last half-hour of your
commute home fuming about the latest unpleasant court appearance before a
judge. This particular judge engaged in repeated exasperating behavior and
has a reputation for making poor decisions from the bench. You believe the
judge unnecessarily frustrates your attempts to secure justice for your client.
You arrive home and type an impassioned letter delineating the misdeeds of
the judge. Do you e-mail the letter to the opposing counsel to support some
manner of alternative dispute resolution outside of the courtroom? Do you
forward the letter to colleagues asking for advice? Or, alternatively, do you
post it to Facebook hoping for some kind of social media social justice? To
many attorneys' surprise, an affirmative answer to any of these questions
could result in severe disciplinary actions for the online advocacy. The
blurred distinction between private and public speech on the Internet might
lead some lawyers to make comments that a court would find a reasonable
attorney would not have made. Such comments often violate various rules
promulgated by state bar associations that govern attorney conduct-particu-
larly speech that criticizes the judiciary. Additionally, state bar associations
punish conduct or speech they find prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice. In an effort to balance the state's interest in providing fair and impartial
trials, as well as a lawyer's right to free speech, various state bar associations
adopted the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. Unfortunately, application of the rules to specific disciplinary proceed-
ings has resulted in a melee of lower court decisions applying various
standards and punishments. Accordingly, attorneys face uncertainty as to
how courts, bar associations, and other governing entities may view their
speech in light of the different standards.
In the modem world, the offending attorney speech now appears on
both the Internet and in print publications. Multiple state bar associations
have sanctioned attorneys for speech made online that they found violated
the professional conduct rules. These cases highlight the multiple platforms
on which attorneys may "speak" on the Internet. More importantly, these
cases also reveal unique aspects of Internet communication that make online
speech more susceptible to widespread dissemination. Due to the unique na-
ture of online speech, state bar associations have strongly indicated that of-
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fensive online speech made will not enjoy First Amendment protections.
Although state bar associations have taken steps to educate attorneys about
professional responsibility and the pitfalls of social media use, bar associa-
tions could further delineate the distinction between private and public online
speech so that lawyers may engage in free speech while maintaining appro-
priate attorney conduct.
This comment will first examine First Amendment jurisprudence that
provides insight into the permissible scope of these regulations. Next, this
comment will examine five cases in which disciplinary committees sanc-
tioned attorneys for speech made about the judiciary. Then, this comment
will address four cases in which attorneys violated related disciplinary rules
through their online speech. Finally, this comment will explore the tension
between private and public online speech and how various bar associations
can better educate attorneys on the matter. As will be discussed below, state
bar associations should take more proactive steps to educate their attorneys
about the potential ramifications of speaking on the Internet, and they should
offer more resources for attorneys who wish to research potential disciplinary
issues that might arise from such conduct.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Model Rules)
indirectly address the issue of attorney speech regarding the judiciary in
Rules 8.2(a) and 8.4(d).1 Rule 8.2(a) states, in relevant part, "[a] lawyer shall
not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disre-
gard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge."2 In 1964, the Supreme Court set out an actual malice standard re-
garding libelous speech in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and Rule 8.2(a)
tracks that language.3 Instead of courts holding attorneys to the Sullivan sub-
jective knowledge test, however, they often hold attorneys to a more unde-
fined reasonable attorney standard-a discrepancy with important
ramifications for attorney discipline.
Rule 8.4(d) states in relevant part, "[i]t is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice."4 The rule does not define what conduct may be "prejudicial to the
administration of justice," so a myriad of conduct may violate the rule, in-
cluding attorney speech.5 Most states adopted similar rules with analogous
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.2(a), r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR Ass'N
2013).
2. Id. r. 8.2(a).
3. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), with
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.2(a).
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d).
5. See In re McCool, 172 So. 3d 1058 (La. 2015). Although this case involves
violation of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct, the language of the
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language to the ABA Model Rules.6 Consequently, state bar associations
commonly regulate attorney speech critical of the judiciary under the guise of
conduct that the association deems prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
A. In re Sawyer
In an early case involving attorney speech, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not address the constitutional implications of rules governing attorney
speech. Six weeks after the trial began, in which attorney Harriet Sawyer
served as defense counsel, Sawyer made comments that allegedly impugned
the judicial integrity of presiding Judge Jon Wiig.7 The speech referred to
"'horrible and shocking' things at the trial; the impossibility of a fair trial;
the necessity, if the Government's case were to be proved, of scrapping the
rules of evidence; and the creation of new crimes unless the trial were
stopped at once."8 The Ethics Committee found that Sawyer's speech vio-
lated Canon I of the Canons of Professional Ethics by accusing Judge Wiig
of unfairness in the trial at hand.9
The Supreme Court limited its review of the case to the question of
whether the facts supported the Committee's findings that Sawyer's speech
impugned Judge Wiig's impartiality and fairness in conducting the trial.1o
The Court acknowledged that dissenting legal opinions differ from the
speech at hand by stating, "[d]issenting opinions in our reports are apt to
make [Sawyer's] speech look like tame stuff indeed."11 The Court then em-
phasized that lawyers should not make impugning comments during a pend-
ing case. 12 The Court here quelled any question as to whether a lawyer's
speech may be more censurable in pending litigation or more censurable be-
cause the lawyer is involved in a case.
violated rule is identical to that of MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr r. 8.2(a).
The Louisiana Supreme Court disbarred attorney Joyce Nanine McCool for
comments she made on the Internet that the court deemed "prejudicial to the
administration of justice." See id. at 1078. This comment will address McCool
in depth.
6. See Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, AM. B. Ass'N, http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model
rules-of professional conduct/chrono list-state-adopting-model-rules.html
(last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
7. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 623-25 (1959).
8. Id. at 630.
9. Id. at 625.
10. Id. at 626.
11. Id. at 635.
12. Id.
2016) 1,85
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Ultimately, the Court found that Sawyer's comments did not cross the
line of impugning Judge Wiig, primarily because the speech did not mention
the judge personally.13 As a result, the Court struck down the suspension
order without deciding the constitutionality of a rule that mandated respectful
behavior and speech.14 Although the Court did not rule on the constitutional-
ity of Canon 1 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the Court made clear
that lawyers may be held responsible for speech made in both pending and
non-pending litigation regardless of whether they are personally involved.
B. In re Snyder
The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently declined to rule on the constitu-
tionality of another rule that regulated attorney speech criticizing the judici-
ary because the content of the speech in question did not necessitate
suspension from the practice of law.15 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
46 states that an attorney may be disciplined if "found guilty of 'conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar of the court.' "16 The secretary of a district
judge in the U.S. District Court of the District of North Dakota received a
"harsh" letter from attorney Robert Snyder concerning unapproved expendi-
tures for his service representing a defendant under the Criminal Justice
Act.17 The Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
threatened to issue an order directing Sawyer to show why he should not be
suspended from practice in the Circuit unless Sawyer apologized for the let-
ter.18 After Sawyer refused to apologize, the judge issued the threatened or-
der, and the Eighth Circuit suspended Sawyer from the practice of law in the
Eighth Circuit for six months because Sawyer's "disrespectful" speech ren-
dered him unfit to practice law in the federal courts. 19 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that Sawyer's speech as a single instance of potential
misbehavior did not indicate that Sawyer was unfit to be a member of the
bar, and the Court noted that the letter in question was addressed to an ad-
ministrative employee, not a specific judge.20
The Court provided insight into the phrase "conduct unbecoming a
member of the bar of the court" by determining that the phrase should be
interpreted in light of the "complex code of behavior to which attorneys are
13. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 634.
14. Id. at 636.
15. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 642-43, 647 (1985).
16. Id. at 635.
17. Id. at 634.
18. Id. at 638.
19. Id. at 634-35.
20. Id. at 646-47.
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subject."21 Additionally, the Court determined that the phrase means "con-
duct contrary to professional standards that shows an unfitness to discharge
continuing obligations to clients or the courts, or conduct inimical to the ad-
ministration of justice."22 Finally, the Court found, "'the lore of the profes-
sion"' provided guidance in determining if an act constitutes "conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar."23 The Court clearly indicated a preference
for maintaining a requirement of respectful speech in light of the traditions of
the legal profession even though it did not rule on the constitutionality of
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46.
C. Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada
The U.S. Supreme Court took a more in depth look at attorney speech in
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, which involved a state rule of professional
conduct. In 1991, the Court found that a Nevada rule governing attorney
speech violated the First Amendment rights of attorney Dominic Gentile.24
The State Bar of Nevada sanctioned Gentile for comments he made at a press
conference about a pending case. 25 A jury acquitted Gentile's client of crimi-
nal charges six months after he held a press conference about the original
indictment.26 At the press conference, Gentile criticized the "character, credi-
bility, reputation, [and] criminal record of the police detective and other po-
tential witnesses" the prosecutor presented. 27 The State Bar of Nevada filed a
complaint against Gentile for making the statements because the comments
allegedly violated Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177.28 The rule in question
prohibited attorneys from making extrajudicial statements that he or she
should know would "have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a
judicial proceeding."29
The Court gave credence to the importance of protecting political
speech critical of government officials-in this. case, speech about the
elected prosecutor. Specifically, the Court recognized "[t]he judicial system,
and in particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a democratic
state, and the public has a legitimate interest in their operations."30 However,
21. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. at 635.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 645.
24. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1033 (1991).
25. Id. at 1030.
26. Id.
27. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 787 P.2d 386, 387 (1990), rev'd, 501 U.S. 1030
(1991).
28. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1035.
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the Court confined its holding narrowly, only determining the constitutional-
ity of the Nevada rule.31
1. Constitutional Analysis of Nevada Rule 177
The Court first engaged in a constitutional analysis of Nevada's inter-
pretation and application of Rule 177. The Court noted, "a court [makes] its
own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow
from the particular utterance and then to balance the character of the evil ...
against the need for free and unfettered expression."32 Therefore, courts must
balance the state's interest in regulating lawyers and a lawyer's First Amend-
ment rights regarding the speech in question when issuing decisions regard-
ing lawyer conduct. The Court ultimately concluded that the formulation of
the Nevada rule did not fail First Amendment review because the rule prop-
erly balanced the State's interest in providing fair trials with a lawyer's inter-
est in freedom of speech.33
2. Dicta About Attorney Disciplinary Rules
The opinion provided important insight into the issue of regulating at-
torney speech. It declared, "the American judicial trial remains one of the
purest, most rational forums for the lawful determination of disputes."34 The
Court noted that lawyers should not frustrate the judicial system by making
allegations about the judiciary to the press. 35 It conceded, however, that it
might be necessary to make comments to the press in order to prevent "abuse
of the courts."36
Finally, the Court found that, although Gentile did not provide the rele-
vant opportunity to define the outer limits of acceptable regulation of attor-
ney speech regarding a pending adjudication,37 rules governing the legal
profession cannot regulate beyond that which the First Amendment pro-
tects. 38 The Court opined, "First Amendment protection survives even when
the attorney violates a disciplinary rule he swore to obey when admitted to
the practice of law."39 The Court reiterated that the First Amendment protects
lawyers' speech even if a regulating body considers otherwise.40
31. Id. at 1036.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1037.
34. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1058.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1057.
38. Id. at 1054.
39. Id.
40. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1054.
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D. First Amendment Background on Libel: The States are at Odds
ABA Model Rule 8.2(a) states in relevant part, "[a] lawyer shall not
make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard
as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a
judge."41 This language aligns directly with the language from Sullivan, in
which the Supreme Court held that a public official could only recover "dam-
ages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice."42 The statement
must be made with "knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reck-
less disregard of whether the statement was false or not."43 Although the
ABA Model Rules language parallels Sullivan, courts often apply a reasona-
ble attorney standard instead of the Sullivan subjective malice standard when
determining whether to sanction attorney speech.44 Comments to the ABA
Model Rules do not shed light on why the language tracks Sullivan.
1. The Florida Bar v. Ray
The Florida Supreme Court, which declined to duplicate the speech in
question issued by attorney Michael Ray, held that the First Amendment did
not protect the speech because Ray did not have an "objectively reasonable
basis in fact for making the statements."45 The speech in question allegedly
violated Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-8.2(a), which states, "[a]
lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge."46 The court contended that Ray's comments allegedly
questioned the "veracity and integrity" and the fairness of the judge before
whom Ray had appeared.47 After the Florida Bar filed a complaint of minor
misconduct against Ray,48 a referee appointed to hear the case found that Ray
violated the relevant rule.49
The Florida Supreme Court first analyzed Ray's speech against the
backdrop of his duties as a lawyer, and it conceded that the ethical rules,
which prohibit critical speech that impugns the judiciary, are not intended to
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
43. Id. at 280.
44. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. 2001); In re Simon, 913
So. 2d 816, 824 (La. 2005); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 793
N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ohio 2003).
45. Ray, 797 So. 2d at 558.
46. Id. at 557.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 557-58.
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shield judges from criticism.50 The court added an additional consideration
that the rules exist to "preserve public confidence in the fairness and imparti-
ality" of the judicial system. 5' Nevertheless, the court noted that the state has
a compelling interest in applying a different standard than the standard ap-
plied in defamation cases. 5 2 The court specifically asserted that the standard
should be "whether the attorney had an objectively reasonable factual basis
for making the statements."53
Notably, Ray argued that the appropriate standard to apply is the subjec-
tive Sullivan standard.54 Although the court conceded that the language in
Sullivan and the relevant Florida disciplinary rule are similar, it outright re-
jected the subjective standard because defamation law and attorney discipli-
nary rules serve significantly different interests.55 The court ultimately sided
with the referee, who heard the relevant evidence, and found that Ray's state-
ments were false and made with reckless disregard as to their truth or fal-
sity.56 Finally, the court highlighted the importance of maintaining public
confidence in the judiciary, and it emphasized that Ray's speech might
"erode public confidence in the judicial system."57 However, the speech in
this case occurred privately in a letter to the judge.58 The court then publicly
reprimanded Ray for the speech contained in the letters,59 and the U.S. Su-
preme Court denied Ray's petition for a writ of certiorari.60
This case shows the willingness of courts and disciplinary committees
to extend their punitive powers into private speech. On the one hand, Ray's
speech that allegedly impugned the judge reached the judge's eyes and ears
directly because Ray sent the derisive letter to the judge himself.61 On the
other hand, the disciplinary committee and court seemed concerned with pro-
tecting the public perception of the judiciary.62 Because the court chose to
use the reasonable attorney standard, the court then had to compare Ray to
the fictitious and undefined reasonable attorney as opposed to performing an
analysis of his speech under the more flexible Sullivan standard. It seems
50. Id. at 558.
51. Ray, 797 So. 2d at 558-59.
52. Id. at 559.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 558.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 557.
57. Ray, 797 So. 2d at 560.
58. Id. at 557.
59. Id. at 558.
60. Ray v. Fla. Bar, 535 U.S. 930 (2002).
61. Ray, 797 So. 2d at 557.
62. Id. at 560.
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obvious that the court would consider that a reasonable attorney would abide
by the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct and not impugn a judge directly
to the judge. Ray, therefore, received a public reprimand for his private
speech.
2. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner
The Ohio Supreme Court also applied the objective reasonable attorney
standard to determine whether a lawyer knowingly made false accusations
against a judge instead of the subjective Sullivan standard.6 3 Mark Gardner
allegedly violated several provisions of the Ohio Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, including two that prohibited lawyers from engaging in undigni-
fied or discourteous conduct towards a tribunal and knowingly making a
false accusation about a judge.64 The Ohio Disciplinary Counsel filed a com-
plaint against him for statements made in a motion to the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit.65
While the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged that at least three states
have used the actual malice subjective standard from Sullivan to address at-
torney speech that accuses members of the judiciary of some sort of miscon-
duct, 66 the court agreed with the "majority of courts that have addressed this
issue," and it adopted an objective standard.67 The court held that an attorney
could face punishment for making comments about the judiciary that a rea-
sonable attorney would not believe to be true. 68 The court defined the rea-
sonable attorney standard as one that "assesses an attorney's statements in
terms of what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his profes-
sional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances [and] focuses
on whether the attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making the state-
ments."69 The court determined that Gardner simply assumed the judges were
biased and corrupt, and so his comments were subject to sanction under the
reasonable attorney standard.70 In the court's view, a reasonable attorney
would not assume judicial bias and corruption without an inquiry into the
matter.71 The court suspended Gardner from practicing law in Ohio for six
63. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ohio 2003).
64. Id. at 426.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 431 (citing In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1085 (Colo. 2000); Okla. Bar
Ass'n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958 (Okla. 1988); Ramsey v. Bd. of Prof'1 Responsi-
bility, 771 S.W.2d 116 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989)).
67. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d at 431.
68. Id. at 432.
69. Id. at 431 (internal quotations omitted).
70. Id. at 432-33.
71. Id. at 432.
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months for violating the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility,72 and the
U.S. Supreme Court denied Gardner's petition for a writ of certiorari.73
This case involved relatively private speech made about judges because
the speech at issue occurred in a motion to the court. 74 Much like the letter to
the judge in the case of attorney Michael Ray in Florida, this speech also
only ever reached the eyes and ears of judges and not the public.75 Neverthe-
less, the disciplinary committee and the reviewing court felt it incumbent
upon themselves to discipline Gardner for the speech because it allegedly
impugned the judges to whom the motion was directed.76 This court also
applied the reasonable attorney standard because it acknowledged that a ma-
jority of the courts apply that standard to attorney disciplinary cases. 77 At the
very least, however, the reviewing court defined the parameters of a reasona-
ble attorney and used that definition to decide that Gardner did not act in
accordance with the proscribed considerations. This conceivably put other
Ohio lawyers on notice that courts would apply a reasonable attorney stan-
dard to attorney disciplinary cases, which allows attorneys to proceed with
their speech knowing that certain bounds exist to what a reasonable attorney
might say in a similar situation.
3. In re Simon
The Louisiana Office of Disciplinary Council filed three counts of for-
mal charges against attorney Clemille Simon because he filed various mo-
tions to recuse several judges from cases in which he was scheduled to
litigate.78 Simon wrote that that one judge "embark[ed] upon a campaign of
misrepresenting the truth" and that another judge "violated not only control-
ling legal authority but the very principals [sic] (honesty and fundamental
fairness) upon which our judicial system is based."79 The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that he violated Rule 8.2(a) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct.o
The court determined that it would adopt an objective standard rather
than a subjective standard to the case at bar.81 Specifically, the court held that
an attorney violates Rule 8.2(a) when he makes accusations that, with the
72. Id. at 433.
73. Gardner v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 540 U.S. 1220 (2004).
74. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d at 431.
75. See id.; see also Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 2001).
76. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d at 432.
77. Id. at 431.
78. In re Simon, 913 So. 2d 816, 819-21 (La. 2005).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 825; see also La. St. B. art. 16 r. 8.2(a) (2016).
81. Simon, 913 So. 2d at 824.
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exercise of ordinary care, he should have known to be false.82 Additionally,
an attorney's subjective belief in the truth of the speech did not excuse a
violation of Rule 8.2(a).83 The court concluded that Simon made the state-
ments with full knowledge of their falsity and that a reasonable person
would not have believed Simon's criticism of the judiciary was warranted.84
The court then suspended Simon from practicing law in Louisiana for six
months,85 and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Simon's petition for a writ of
certiorari in 2006.86
This case, remarkably, also involved relatively private speech made in
various motions to judges. Again, both the disciplinary committee and the
reviewing court found it necessary to review this conduct under an objective
standard and to ultimately sanction the speech. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, however, applied a reasonable person standard as opposed to a rea-
sonable attorney standard, although the difference between the two standards
did not materialize in this case. Ultimately, Simon failed the reasonable per-
son standard and, therefore, endured a six-month suspension from the prac-
tice of law in Louisiana.
4. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted a version of the
Sullivan standard in an attorney discipline case.87 Lawyer Stephen Yagman
made comments to the Los Angeles Daily Journal about Judge Keller, a
judge before whom Yagman was to appear during litigation, stating that
Judge Keller "has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers."88 Yagman
also gave negative comments to Prentice Hall about Judge Keller, which
were to be published in the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary.89 In addition,
Yagman placed an advertisement in the Los Angeles Daily Journal request-
ing that lawyers contact him if Judge Keller had sanctioned them.90 After the
Standing Committee on Discipline of the U.S. District Court of California
instituted disciplinary proceedings against Yagman, the court held that
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 826.
85. Id.
86. Simon, 547 U.S. 1128 (2006).
87. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).
88. Id. at 1434 (quoting Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman, Refers Case to
State Bar, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 1991, at 1).
89. Id. at 1434.
90. Id.
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Yagman had committed misconduct worthy of sanctions and suspended him
from practicing law in the Central District for two years. 9 1
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first determined whether Yagman's speech
violated Local Rule 2.5.2, which prohibited attorneys from engaging in con-
duct that impugns the integrity of the judiciary, as well as conduct that "inter-
feres with the administration of justice."92 The court determined that
Yagman's speech allegedly impugning the integrity of the judge was only
punishable if the speech was capable of being proved false.93 The court con-
cluded that Yagman's speech lacked proof of falsity and thus could not be
sanctioned. 94
This case marks a dramatic shift from the above cases because it
adopted the Sullivan standard in an attorney disciplinary hearing, as opposed
to the reasonable attorney standard that most of the courts have applied. The
court focused on whether Yagman's speech could be proven true or false
instead of what a reasonable attorney would believe or say about a judge.
This arguably allowed for a more objective investigation into the speech be-
cause it did not rest on untested and undefined parameters of a reasonable
attorney. Instead, the analysis simply focused on the truth or falsity of the
speech and assessed the sanction accordingly. Because the court concluded
that Yagman's speech lacked proof of falsity, it reversed the sanctions levied
against him by the lower court.95 This holding presents important implica-
tions for attorney disciplinary matters because it shows that interpreting at-
torneys' speech under the Sullivan standard allows courts to focus on the
speech itself and not the fictitious specter of a reasonable attorney. If courts,
to which the attorney directs the speech in these circumstances, possess the
power to decide what a reasonable attorney would say about the judiciary,
then lawyers must bend to the will of the judiciary and act accordingly. If
courts scrutinize the speech itself, however, then lawyers stand accountable
only for the truth or falsity of the speech instead of the indeterminate status
of a reasonable attorney.
91. Id. at 1435.
92. Id. at 1436 (quoting Cent. Dist. of Cal. Local r. 2.5.2).
93. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
94. Id. at 1440-42 ("Yagman disclosed the basis for his view that Judge Keller is
anti-Semitic and has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: that he, Ken-
ner and Manes are all Jewish and had been sanctioned by Judge Keller. The
statement did not imply the existence of additional, undisclosed facts; it was
carefully phrased in terms of an inference drawn from the facts specified rather
than a bald accusation of bias against Jews.").
95. See id. at 1441-42, 1445.
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5. In re Green
The Colorado Grievance Committee suspended attorney Lawrence
Green for sixty days for making critical remarks about a judge.96 In its opin-
ion, the Colorado Supreme Court referenced the U.S. Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the Sullivan actual malice test to a criminal defamation case
involving the prosecution of a lawyer for criticizing a judge.97 The court also
acknowledged that several courts applied the same test, or a modification of
it, to cases regarding attorney discipline for making comments critical of the
judiciary.98 The court agreed with the jurisdictions that applied the Sullivan
standard to attorney disciplinary cases and held that it too would apply the
Sullivan test.99 The court established the following two-part test to determine
whether attorneys may be sanctioned for speech critical of the judiciary:
(1) whether the disciplinary authority has proven that the state-
ment was a false statement of fact (or a statement of opinion that
necessarily implies an undisclosed false assertion of fact); and (2)
assuming the statement is false, whether the attorney uttered the
statement with actual malice-that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard as to its truth.oo
Ultimately, the court held Green's speech was "statements of opinion based
upon fully disclosed and uncontested facts," and therefore it could not be
sanctioned.101
This case also serves as an example of a court departing from the rea-
sonable attorney standard and instead applying the Sullivan standard. While
it is unclear why the court thought the Sullivan standard was more appropri-
ate than the reasonable attorney standard for this particular attorney disci-
pline case, the court does appear to have been influenced by the context of
the Sullivan case. The court noted that although Sullivan involved criminal
defamation, the Supreme Court applied the Sullivan test to a criminal defa-
mation case involving a lawyer criticizing a judge.102 The court also noted
that the Supreme Court "considers attorney discipline a 'quasi-criminal'
96. In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Colo. 2000).
97. Id. at 1084; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964).
98. Green, 11 P.3d at 1084 (referencing Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-38); U.S. Dist.
Court for E. Dist. of Wash. v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993); In re
Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 320-21
(Minn. 1990); State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
99. Green, 11 P.3d at 1085.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1086.
102. Id. at 1084.
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sanction." 0 Therefore, the court decided sufficient reason existed to apply
the Sullivan standard to the case at hand. This court's approach and interpre-
tation offers a viable alternative to courts that still must decide which stan-
dard to apply to attorney disciplinary cases.
6. Implications of the Reasonable Attorney Standard and the
Sullivan Standard
The distinction between the rigid, ambiguous reasonable attorney stan-
dard and the less severe Sullivan standard is important because a correlation
exists between the standard used and the length and severity of the punish-
ment given. For example, the courts in the first three cases above used the
reasonable attorney standard to assess the speech at issue, and all three cases
resulted in harsher punishments as compared to the latter two cases that used
the Sullivan standard.104 Under the reasonable attorney standard, Michael
Ray received a public reprimand; Mark Gardner was suspended from practic-
ing law for six months; and Clemille Simon was suspended from practicing
law for six months.105 In comparison, under the Sullivan standard, Stephen
Yagman received a reversal of his original two-year suspension, and Law-
rence Green received a public reprimand and a fine in return for a reversal of
his original sixty-day suspension.1 06 A public reprimand and six-month sus-
pensions stand in stark contrast to the outright reversals of suspension from
practicing law. Therefore, attorneys likely want courts to apply the more
flexible Sullivan standard as opposed to the rigid reasonable attorney stan-
dard when judging attorney discipline cases.
It is not clear why the reasonable attorney standard generally results in
harsher sanctions as opposed to the sanctions that come out of the Sullivan
standard. One reason may be that the reasonable attorney standard affords
courts the leeway to punish attorneys who say things that the judiciary deems
untoward conduct directed at the tribunal. After all, if the ABA Model Rules
do not allow attorneys to impugn judges, then judges likely want to enforce
the Model Rules so as to maintain their reputations. The untested parameters
of what a reasonable attorney would do allows for judges and disciplinary
committees to assert that a reasonable attorney would not impugn the judici-
ary because the ABA Model Rules do not allow for that conduct. However,
that results in a closed-loop situation in which a reasonable attorney would
not impugn the judiciary, while an unreasonable attorney might find im-
103. Id. (citing In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968)).
104. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. 2001); Disciplinary Coun-
sel v. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d 425, 431 (Ohio 2003); In re Simon, 913 So. 2d 816,
824 (La. 2005); Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1437
(9th Cir. 1995); Green, 11 P.3d at 1085.
105. See Ray, 797 So. 2d at 560; Gardner, 793 N.E.2d at 433; Simon, 913 So. 2d at
827.
106. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434, 1445; Green, 11 P.3d at 1080.
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pugning the judiciary necessary in order to draw attention to potential
misbehavior.
In light of attorneys making statements on the Internet, the distinction
between the reasonable attorney standard and the Sullivan standard is signif-
icant because attorneys need to be aware that their online speech may result
in harsh retribution by disciplinary committees and judges. Would a reasona-
ble attorney make online comments about knowledge of a corrupt judge?
What if that attorney had first-hand knowledge of the judge's corruption?
And what if there was no viable alternative other than alerting the public
about the corruption? Attorneys deserve to have courts either lay out the
reasonable attorney standard more explicitly and define its parameters, or
apply the Sullivan standard to attorney disciplinary cases so as to allow for
more flexible analyses of specific circumstances.
HI. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Attorneys, practitioners of a speaking profession, naturally turn to any
available outlets to speak. From newspaper columns, magazine articles, and
books, attorneys often use their words to promote ideas and effect change.
With the rise of the Internet, attorneys logically use it as a medium to express
their thoughts and opinions. However, this tendency to share information
over the Internet can result in over-sharing. Attorneys, therefore, need to be
extremely cognizant of their duties as members of a regulated profession
because their online speech may come under close scrutiny. Nevertheless,
attorneys want to engage in sharing information over the Internet with as
much freedom as possible. Thus, a tension exists between the human desire
to speak on the Internet and the responsibility of attorneys to stay within the
bounds of the ABA Model Rules. The following cases illustrate the ways in
which attorneys' online speech may violate the ABA Model Rules and
demonstrate the need for attorneys to be both informed and aware about the
consequences that might stem from their Internet speech.
A. In re McCool
Louisiana attorney Joyce Nanine McCool ran afoul of the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct when she posted online statements about
cases pending in both Louisiana and Mississippi.107 A Mississippi judge first
filed a complaint against McCool with the Louisiana Disciplinary Board of
the Office of the Disciplinary Counsel (ODC), and the ODC then filed offi-
cial charges against McCool.108
Originally, McCool filed a petition in Louisiana for adoption proceed-
ings on behalf of Raven Skye Boyd Maurer's new husband, who sought to
107. In re McCool, 172 So. 3d 1058, 1061 (La. 2015).
108. Id. at 1065.
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adopt Maurer's two children.109 McCool also filed a motion for emergency
custody on Maurer's behalf because Maurer alleged that her former husband
sexually abused their two young daughters.10 After presiding Judge Dawn
Amacker stayed the adoption proceedings, pending the resolution of the Mis-
sissippi parental rights case involving Maurer and her former husband, Mc-
Cool filed a writ application with the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeal as
well as writs with the Louisiana Supreme Court.'], Both courts denied the
writs.112
McCool and Maurer then posted a petition titled, "Justice for [H] and
[Z]," on the website www.change.org, asking Judge Gambrell to, among
other things, renounce jurisdiction in the child custody case to the Louisiana
court and to alter various aspects of the guardian ad litem arrangement. 113
McCool and Maurer also requested that Judge Amacker withdraw the stay of
the adoption proceedings and set a hearing to allow Maurer's new husband to
testify regarding why it would be in the girls' best interest that they be
adopted by him.114 McCool took other actions to spread the petition on the
Internet by re-posting it on her personal weblog, in online articles she au-
thored, and on her personal Twitter account.1 15 In those mediums, McCool
added contact information for the judges' offices and the Louisiana Supreme
Court. Additionally, she added comments encouraging others to communi-
cate their opinions about the pending cases to the relevant judges and the
Louisiana Supreme Court.116
Someone, although it is unknown whom, faxed a copy of the online
petition and the comments to Judge Amacker's office in Louisiana.117 The
Louisiana Supreme Court's opinion indicates that either Maurer or Maurer's
mother faxed the petition to Judge Amacker's office.11s Judge Amacker in-
structed her assistant to return the petition to McCool and cautioned Maurer
against ex parte communications with a judge.119 McCool, however, contin-
ued discussing the cases online.120 For disciplinary purposes, the Louisiana
Supreme Court contended that McCool's additional comments, posts, and
109. Id. at 1060-61.
110. Id. at 1061.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. In re McCool, 172 So. 3d at 1061.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1061, 1063.
116. Id. at 1062.
117. Id.
118. Id.




tweets contained "false, misleading, and inflammatory statements about the
manner in which Judge Gambrell and Judge Amacker were handling the
pending cases."21
Following a hearing, the ODC Hearing Committee found that McCool
violated Rules 3.5(a), 3.5(b), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) of the Louisiana Rules
of Professional Conduct.122 Specifically, the Committee found McCool "vio-
lated a duty owed to the public and the legal system" because she "acted
knowingly, if not intentionally."123 The Disciplinary Board adopted the Com-
mittee's recommendation that McCool be suspended from the practice of law
for one year and one day, that she be required to attend the Louisiana State
Bar Association's Ethics School, and that she be assessed with the costs and
expenses of the proceeding.1 24 In response, McCool filed an objection to the
Disciplinary Board's recommendation, and the case was docketed for oral
argument before the Louisiana Supreme Court,125 which serves as the appel-
late court for issues concerning the Louisiana State Bar.126
McCool argued that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
Article 1, § 7 of the Louisiana Constitution guaranteed her right to free
speech and that speech addressing matters of public concern, in particular,
may not be restricted.127 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that
McCool engaged in improper ex parte communication with the two judges
before whom the cases were pending because McCool promoted an online
petition that targeted the judges and the cases at hand.128 Additionally, the
court concluded that McCool's conduct was prejudicial to the administration
of justice129 The court strongly disagreed with McCool's First Amendment
argument 30 and declared that the profession does not allow for conduct of
this type.131
After determining that McCool violated the Louisiana Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, the court considered various factors in assessing sanctions
against her.1 32 The court found, among other things, that McCool intention-
121. Id. at 1064.
122. Id. at 1067.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. In re McCool, 172 So. 3d at 1067.
126. Id. at 1068.
127. Brief of Respondent at *10, In re McCool, 172 So. 3d 1058 (La. 2015) (No. 13-
DB-059) 2015 WL 2358383.
128. In re McCool, 172 So. 3d at 1073.
129. Id. at 1078.
130. Id. at 1075.
131. Id. at 1077.
132. Id. at 1078-79.
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ally engaged in writing and posting the petition online.133 Ultimately, the
court found that McCool's online speech imposed an "intolerable disservice"
to the judicial system, and although McCool contained no prior disciplinary
record, the court ordered disbarment.134
After the First Circuit Court of Appeals and the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied both of McCool's writ applications regarding the stay of the
adoption proceedings,1 35 McCool assumed that she had temporarily ex-
hausted her legal options in the face of continuing alleged child molesta-
tion.136 McCool alleged that this legal stalemate led her to engage in the
online speech.137 In her sworn statement to the ODC counsel, McCool said,
"I had-I had to have a sit down with myself about whether or not how
involved I wanted to be in drafting the petition. But after considering it, you
know, [Maurer] needed my help."l38
The Louisiana State Bar Association website offers resources for Loui-
siana attorneys who have questions about ethical practices.139 McCool alleg-
edly could have sought an opinion from the Louisiana State Bar Association
if she wanted to ensure her online activity would not violate of the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct. However, a search of the Louisiana State Bar
Association website did not return any results for "attorney online speech."40
Even though the website does not explicitly contain an ethics opinion per-
taining to online speech, McCool could have contacted the Association for an
advisory opinion through a telephone call, fax, e-mail, or letter.141 Addition-
ally, McCool could have sought advice from the Louisiana Disciplinary
Board website which contains Useful Links for Louisiana attorneys. 142 One
link on this page directs the user to www.legalethics.com, a website that con-
133. Id. at 1081.
134. In re McCool, 172 So. 3d at 1084.
135. Id. at 1061.
136. Id. at 1080.
137. Id. ("[B]ecause the appeal process is a long process, in the meantime the kids
are being exposed, you know, and they're not being protected .... And even if
we had been successful that would have been two and a half months where
these children were being exposed to this trauma and we were just trying to do
anything we could to protect them.").
138. Id. at 1081.
139. Ethics Advisory Service and Opinions, LA. STATE BAR Ass'N, https://
www.1sba.org/Members/EthicsAdvisary.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
140. Id. (search "attorney online speech").
141. Id.
142. Useful Links, LA. DISCIPLINARY BD., https://www.ladb.org/Resources/Useful-
Links/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
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tains blog posts pertaining to the ethics of technology uses by lawyers.143
However, a search on this website for "attorney online speech" also did not
return any results.144 It remains unclear if McCool understood that her online
speech would result in the harsh punishment of disbarment and if McCool
could have mitigated her exposure to such risk through researching the issue
before she posted comments about the cases online.
B. The Florida Bar v. Conway
Florida attorney Sean Conway made comments on a weblog criticizing
a Fort Lauderdale judge.145 The State Bar of Florida instituted disciplinary
proceedings against him for allegedly violating the following two Florida Bar
rules.: (1) making statements that he or she "knows to be false or with reck-
less disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integ-
rity of a judge"; and (2) "engaging in conduct in connection with the practice
of law that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."46 After a referee
issued a report recommending the Florida Bar discipline Conway, the parties
resolved the case through a conditional guilty plea for consent judgment. 147
The Florida Supreme Court approved of the conditional plea without a writ-
ten opinion.148 It is difficult to deduce whether the Florida Supreme Court
considered Conway's speech in light of a reasonable attorney or through an
alternative test because no written opinion exists.
The Florida State Bar offers the Florida Bar Practice Resource Institute
to its lawyers, with a trove of resources available online.149 This Institute
devotes an entire section to Office Technology, which includes several videos
pertaining to lawyers' use of the Internet.150 Additionally, the Florida Bar's
website promotes the ethics hotline, a resource where lawyers may obtain
advice on ethical issues.' 5 1 However, a search of the Florida Bar Associa-
143. Ethics of Technology Used by Legal Professionals, LEGALETHICS.COM, http://
www.legalethics.com (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
144. Id. (search "attorney online speech").
145. See Lucille A. Jewel, I Can Has Lawyer? The Conflict Between the Par-
ticipatory Culture of the Internet and the Legal Profession, 33 HASTINGS
Comm. & ENT. L.J. 341, 357 (2011).
146. See id. at 357-58 (quoting Fla. Rules of Prof 1 Conduct 4-8.2(a), 4-8.4(d)).
147. See id. at 358.
148. Fla. Bar v. Conway, 996 So.2d 213 (Fla. 2008) (unpublished disposition).
149. The Florida Bar Member Services PRI, THE FLA. BAR, http://www.florida
bar.org/DIVCOM/PI/WebNodes.nsf/Nodes/9072F758DEC35924852577E00
0485BD2 (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
150. Id.
151. The Florida Bar Attorney Discipline, THE FLA. BAR, http://www.floridabar.org
/tfblTFBConsum.nsf/0a92a6dc28e76ae58525700a005d0d53/dbac6623cf5cOl5f
85257a3f0060b781!OpenDocument#EthicsHotline (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
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tion's website for attorney online speech did not return any results.152 Be-
cause it is unknown whether the Florida Supreme Court applied a reasonable
attorney standard to Conway's case, it remains unclear if Conway's criticism
of the judge really violated the relevant professional conduct rules. If his
speech did not violate the rules because a reasonable attorney would have
said the same things, then the online aspect of the speech becomes important.
The Florida Supreme Court may have taken issue with the fact that Conway
posted the critical speech on the Internet where it is easily accessible to the
public. In that case, Conway could have turned to the Florida Bar Associa-
tion for guidance before he posted the comments on the weblog.
C. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peshek
Illinois attorney Kristine Peshek published a weblog with confidential
information about her clients and derogatory statements about judges.153 In
response to the weblog, the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Commission filed a complaint against her for allegedly violating, among
other rules, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 770 which prohibited conduct
"which tends to defeat the administration of justice or bring the courts or the
legal profession into disrepute."54 Peshek wrote on her weblog to express
her thoughts regarding her work as a public defender and to help cope with
the stress of a situation involving an assault upon her by a client in open
court.155 Although Peshek alleged that she believed she adequately concealed
her clients' identities on the weblog, the Illinois Supreme Court suspended
Peshek from practicing law in Illinois for sixty days.1 56 Peshek was also li-
censed to practice law in Wisconsin, and in response to her sanctions in Illi-
nois, the Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently imposed an identical
sanction.'15 Neither court issued an explanation for the disciplinary action, so
it remains unclear if the courts sanctioned her for the critical remarks about
the judges.
The website for the State Bar of Wisconsin contains an Ethics link, but
access is restricted to Bar members.158 Presumably, Peshek could have ac-
cessed the website and used the ethics resources offered. Additionally, a
search of the Bar's website for attorney online speech returned relevant re-
152. The Florida Bar, THE FLA. BAR, http://www.floridabar.org (search "attorney
online speech") (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
153. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Peshek, 798 N.W.2d 879 (Wis. 2011).
154. Id. at 880.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 881.
158. State Bar of Wisconsin for Members, STATE BAR OF Wis., http:f/
www.wisbar.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
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suits to legal ethics regarding lawyers' online speech.159 Finally, Peshek
could have called the State Bar of Wisconsin ethics hotline for clarification
on the matter. The Illinois State Bar Association likewise offers an Ethics
section of their website for the Bar's members.1 60 The Association offers a
list of ethics advisory opinions by subject, but none of the subjects explicitly
pertain to Internet speech;61 a search of attorney online speech returned zero
results.162 While Peshek may not have succeeded in researching the ethics
surrounding posting her comments online, she could have at least called both
states' ethics hotlines to gain guidance on the matter.
D. In re Ogden
Indiana attorney Paul Ogden endured a complaint filed against him by
the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission for comments he made
in a private e-mail between Ogden and an opposing counsel.1 63 The Commis-
sion alleged that Ogden violated Rule 8.2(a) of the Indiana Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct for allegedly making statements that "[a] lawyer knows to be
false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifi-
cations or integrity of a judge."64 According to the Indiana Supreme Court's
opinion, Ogden "engaged in correspondence with the . . . mother [of the
decedent] and later with Judge Coleman in which he made highly critical
statements about Judge Coleman."165 The court held that the correct test to
evaluate Ogden's statements was whether Ogden lacked any objectively rea-
sonable basis for making the statements in consideration of the statements'
nature and context.1 66 The court concluded, because Judge Coleman was not
presiding over the trial at the time that Ogden's statements referenced, that
Ogden's statements were false.167 Accordingly, the court held Ogden made
the statements in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity because he lacked
159. State Bar of Wisconsin, STATE BAR OF Wis., http://www.wisbar.org (search
"attorney online speech") (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
160. Practice Tools Ethics, ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N, http://www.isba.org/ethics (last
visited Aug. 30, 2016).
161. Practice Tools Ethics Opinions by Subject, ILL. STATE BAR Ass'N, http://
www.isba.org/ethics/bysubject (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
162. Id. (search "attorney online speech").
163. See Paul Ogden, A Must Read for Indiana Attorneys: My Disciplinary Case
and Its Impact on Attorney Free Speech in Indiana, OGDEN ON POLIncs (July
25, 2013), http://www.ogdenonpolitics.com/2013/07/a-must-read-for-indiana-
attorneys-my.html.
164. See In re Ogden, 10 N.E.3d 499, 500 (Ind. 2014).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 501.
167. Id.
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any reasonable basis for the statements.1 68 The court suspended Ogden from
practicing law in Indiana for thirty days in addition to assessing him one-half
of the costs and expenses of the proceeding.1 69
Ogden claimed that he originally sent an e-mail to the opposing counsel
in an estate case who replied and carbon copied the mother of the deceased
and the executor of the estate on the e-mail.170 Ogden then wrote back ques-
tioning Judge Coleman's behavior in the case.171 The mother of the deceased
then sent the e-mails to Judge Coleman who subsequently wrote Ogden ask-
ing for an apology.17 2 Judge Coleman forwarded the e-mails to the Discipli-
nary Commission when Ogden refused to apologize, and the Commission
filed a grievance against Ogden.173 Ogden endured a twelve-hour disciplinary
proceeding,174 and he alleged that the cost of the disciplinary proceeding re-
sulted in such an unfavorable situation that he let his bar card expire and no
longer practices law.175
The Indiana State Bar Association website contains a catalogue of ethics
opinions; however, they are organized by year so it appears nearly impossi-
ble to find opinions relating to attorney online speech.176 Additionally, a
search for "attorney online speech" returned no relevant results.177 The lack
of resources in this jurisdiction is especially troubling when considering
Ogden's speech occurred in a private e-mail.
These cases show the propensity for which state bar associations and
reviewing courts have to discipline attorneys for online speech that impugns
the judiciary in some way. Whether the speech occurs through weblogs,
Twitter, online petitions, and even private e-mail, attorneys need to be aware
that state bar associations can sanction speech that violates the ABA Model
Rules. If the attorneys in the above cases researched their potential online
speech before they wrote on the Internet, they likely would not have found
168. Id. at 501-02.
169. Id.




174. Dave Stafford, Blogger Attorney Ogden Grilled in Public Discipline Hearing,
THE IND. LAWYER (July 31, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/blogger-
attorney-ogden-grilled-in-public-discipline-hearing/PARAMS/article/32049.
175. Dave Stafford, Ogden Quitting Law, Citing High Disciplinary Fine, THE IND.
LAWYER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/ogden-quitting-law-
citing-high-disciplinary-fine/PARAMSarticle/35323.
176. Ethics Opinions, IND. STATE BAR Ass'N, http://www.inbar.org/?page=legal
ethics-opinion (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
177. Indiana State Bar Association, IND. STATE BAR Ass'N, http://www.inbar.org
(search "attorney online speech") (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
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sufficient information from the state bar associations on the likelihood of
disciplinary action. State bar associations should offer more robust educa-
tional resources specifically focused on the issue of Internet speech for
attorneys.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
A. The Private Versus Public Aspect of the Internet Barely Exists
The ability for content published on the Internet to reach millions of
individuals means attorneys should consider whether the speech they make
online is truly private. Law professor George A. Critchlow wrote a piece for
the Washington State Bar newsletter on the Internet's magnifying effect on
online statements. 78 Professor Critchlow wrote, "[o]urs is a multimedia cul-
ture of 'anything goes' in terms of information that pervades our lives on the
Internet . . . . Information and viewpoints are now communicated instantly
and are capable of being forwarded or rebroadcast to unlimited numbers of
ears and eyes."7 9 Indeed, Critchlow's admonition rings true for attorney Paul
Ogden, whose e-mail ended up in the hands of the judge whom he discussed
in the private communication.1so While Ogden did not intend the judge to
read his e-mail, the judge nevertheless saw the content and set the discipli-
nary process in action, which ultimately led Ogden to resign his bar card and
end his practice as a lawyer.181 Professor Critchlow continued his commen-
tary on the nature of Internet speech stating:
Unfortunately, much questionable information masquerades as
truth to audiences that are not especially skilled at evaluating the
source, authenticity, or reliability of what they hear or see. False
statements, half-truths, insults, abusive comments, and degrading
and insensitive exchanges now have an opportunity to accumulate
and reach audiences that were unimagined in previous genera-
tions. This creates unprecedented opportunities for individuals or
organizations to affect public perceptions.1 82
This observation aligns with the general consensus promulgated by state bar
associations and courts that attorneys should refrain from issuing inflam-
matory remarks about the judiciary because it may damage public perception
178. George A. Critchlow, Attorneys' Criticism of Judges. Professional Misconduct
or Protected Speech?, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, July 2011, Vol. 65 No. 7, at
17, http://www.wsba.org/-/media/Files/NewsEvents/Publications/Bar%20
News/2011%20Full%20Issues/201107JulyBarNews.ashx.
179. Id. at 22.
180. Ogden, supra note 164.
181. Id.
182. Critchlow, supra note 179, at 22.
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of the judicial system.1 83 However, it is important to remember that thirty-
eight states elect their judges to state supreme courts and thirty-one states
elect their judges to intermediate appellate courts.18 4 Therefore, the option
should exist for lawyers to express criticism of judges in the marketplace of
ideas,15 in order to maintain a balance between proper judicial investigations
and informing the public. This argument aligns with the Meiklejohn theory,
which suggests that a government run by the people necessitates unfettered
speech.1 8 6 After all, judges are government officials, many elected under a
party in a political system, and our democratic republic places great value on
keeping the government accountable by and for the people it governs. Never-
theless, state bar associations strive to promote the legal profession as a
whole and so they seek to hold attorneys accountable for speech that maligns
the judiciary. As such, attorneys need proper guidance on how their speech
might run afoul of the various rules. In particular, attorneys need guidance on
how their Internet speech might result in adverse disciplinary matters.
One method for attorneys to judge the privacy of their online speech is
to look at the speech through the lens of more traditional forms of publishing
like books or magazines. Frank D. LoMonte, executive editor of the Student
Press Law Center, wrote, "[e]ven though forums like Facebook feel very
different from books, magazines or newspapers, writing on a Facebook page
is still 'publishing.' That means, for the most part, the same legal principles
created for paper-and-ink publishing should still hold true on a smartphone
screen."87 While this may seem like common-sense advice, some attorneys
may not realize that various Facebook settings may lead their speech to ap-
pear more public than anticipated. Even with the highest privacy settings, a
friend on a social media website can still take a screen shot of anything you
post. This means that anyone who has access to view another individual's
social media account can take a picture of the content and preserve it for any
type of future use, including sending it to otherwise unintended recipients. In
the ever-changing field of social media, it is reasonable to consider that vari-
ous privacy settings may not protect users to the extent that the user intends.
183. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble and Scope 5 (AM. BAR
Ass'N 1983); Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 558-59 (Fla. 2001).
184. See Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AM. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migratedleadership/fact-sheet.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
185. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
186. See Steven B. Lichtman, Black Like Me: The Free Speech Jurisprudence of
Clarence Thomas, 114 PENN ST. L. REv. 415, 449 (2009).
187. Frank D. LoMonte, When It Comes to Social Media, Some Old-School Legal
Rules May Not Apply, STUDENT PRESs LAW CTR., http://www.spic.org/article/
2014/08/when-it-comes-to-social-media-some-old-school-legal-rules-may-not-
apply (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
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Additionally, individuals simply may not understand the privacy set-
tings for various social media platforms. It is incumbent upon those individu-
als to educate themselves on the privacy settings and then pay close attention
to the content they publish. For example, one judge ruled that an individual
who sued for violation of privacy involving disclosure of pictures from her
Facebook page had waived that right when she set her Facebook settings to
open.188 Although the individual was not an attorney, this example serves as
a warning to lawyers who do not have their social media accounts set on
adequate privacy settings. LoMonte further analyzed:
U.S. District Judge Timothy C. Batten ruled that, because Chaney
had knowingly set her Facebook privacy settings to the most
"open" setting possible-allowing "friends of friends" to see eve-
rything she posted-the photo was not "private." Chaney gave up
any claim for invasion of privacy when she willingly shared the
photo in a way that made it accessible to potentially thousands of
people, Batten decided. Chaney's experience is an embarrassing
lesson for the rest of us: Once material is posted on a social-
networking page, the law no longer will consider it "private." It's
unclear how the judge might have ruled if Chaney had used tighter
privacy settings.1 89
Although this case involved a claim for violation of privacy and did not in-
volve an attorney, LoMonte properly points out that even friends-only set-
tings on a social media platform like Facebook may not be considered private
if the user has hundreds of friends on the website.190 Attorneys should be
careful when using new social media platforms and educate themselves on
the various privacy settings. Even then, attorneys should exercise great cau-
tion with regards to what they publish on the website.
B. Communications "Intended" as Private May Not Succeed as Such
Even an attorney's private e-mails may be subject to discipline for the
contents contained therein. When Paul Ogden sent an email criticizing a
judge to the opposing counsel, the opposing counsel's client forwarded the e-
mails to the judge in question, and the judge brought a complaint against
Ogden for criticizing the judiciary.191 Legal scholars criticized this case for
the lack of First Amendment protection implicated by the discipline of
speech contained in an e-mail. A reporter for The Indiana Lawyer asked law
professor Margaret Tarkington about the First Amendment implications of
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[I]t's important that the context wasn't in a judicial proceeding
where the truth-seeking function of the justice system requires a
higher level of accuracy in attorney statements. "He didn't even
put [the criticism] on his blog . . . An attorney should be able to
talk about the judiciary in an email."92
The complicating factor about this situation, however, is that some of the
things Ogden said about Judge Coleman were false: because three different
judges presided over the case at various times, Judge Coleman was not to
blame for all of Ogden's allegations.193 It is somewhat understandable that
Judge Coleman would want to preserve his reputation against blatantly false
accusations. Nevertheless, the tension here between critical and false state-
ments about a judge and the relative privacy of the speech made in an e-mail
highlights the potential for attorneys to suffer consequences for critical
speech made on the Internet even in the most private forum of online
communication.
C. State Bar Associations Can Better Educate Lawyers About
Internet Speech
Various state bar associations and legal entities have issued guidance on
social media use by lawyers. These guidelines provide insight into the pitfalls
attorneys may encounter when speaking on the Internet. Additionally, these
guidelines serve as useful resources for attorneys to consult when deciding
whether or not to elicit the speech. For example, the Oregon Ethics Opinions
suggested that public social media content is as widely viewable as magazine
articles and books.194 This perception could prevent many attorneys from
posting speech on the Internet that might be viewed by a disciplinary com-
mittee as contrary to the ABA Model Rules. While it may seem like a com-
mon-sense approach, emphasizing the public nature of the Internet may make
attorneys think twice before posting. Additionally, for attorneys who may be
new users of social media, this outlook provides clarity in this new territory
of speech.
The U.S. Department of Justice issued guidance to its employees re-
garding social media use, specifically noting that social media does not ex-
pand employee's speech rights.195 Although not necessarily directed towards
lawyers, this guidance provides practical advice that attorneys should follow
192. Dave Stafford, Criticism of Judge Results in Discipline Case, TH-E IND. LAW-
YER (May 22, 2013), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/criticism-of-judge-re
sults-in-discipline-case/PARAMS/article/315 10.
193. Id.
194. Christina Vassiliou Harvey et al., 10 Tips for Avoiding Ethical Lapses When
Using Social Media, Bus. LAW TODAY, http://www.americanbar.org/publica
tions/blt/2014/01/03_harvey.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
195. James M. Cole, Memorandum: Guidance on the Personal Use of Social Media
by Department Employees, U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTICE, 2, Mar. 24, 2014, http://
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when posting speech online.196 Writing for the Department, James M. Cole
wrote, "the line between public and private, personal and professional, is
often blurred, especially when an employee using social media includes his
or her Department affiliation or title, or comments on matters related to his or
her work, or the work of the Department."197 Cole is correct to highlight the
ambiguity between what is public and what is private when an individual
posts on social media. If an attorney posts something on a social media plat-
form on her own time, in her own home, and on her own computer, she may
think that the speech is private and that it will not, or should not, reach a
potential disciplinary committee. Further, a young lawyer with little exposure
or experience with attorney disciplinary matters may not immediately think
that the speech may violate a rule of professional conduct. Equally, an older
attorney may not think that the speech on the social media platform, or even
e-mail, has the potential to disseminate to a wide audience.
Anticipating these types of scenarios, Cole wrote for the Department,
"[i]t is important to note that while vastly accelerating the speed of commu-
nication and greatly broadening the size of the audience, the advent of social
media neither restricts nor expands the existing limitations on Department
employee speech."98 Again, although the Department's guidance does not
apply to all attorneys, it correctly advises that social media, and the Internet
in general, does not necessarily expand speech rights.199 Alternatively, the
Internet does not necessarily restrict speech rights.200 This dichotomy appears
in cases of attorney discipline for speech made on the Internet, and state bar
associations may need to consider alternatives to rules that may unduly bur-
den attorneys' free speech rights.
The Pennsylvania Bar Association brought attention to the important,
and potentially underestimated, fact that clients and other individuals may
discover websites that attorneys may not realize are publicly viewable. In a
Formal Opinion posted on the Pennsylvania Bar Association's website, the
Association warned attorneys:
The Committee emphasizes that attorneys should be conscious
that clients and others may discover those websites, and that infor-
mation contained on those websites is likely to be subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Any social media activities or
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law firm or to an attorney in his or her role as an attorney are
subject to and must comply with the Rules.201
This warning covers almost all likely methods by which an attorney may
publish speech online and warns that the speech may reach the eyes of an
unintended audience. However, this warning does not suggest that speech in
private e-mails may also be subject to the rules of professional responsibil-
ity.202 While it remains unclear if there might have been an alternative out-
come had Ogden's case occurred in Pennsylvania as opposed to Indiana, an
attorney in Pennsylvania would not be on notice from this warning that
speech made in an e-mail might be subject to discipline. Consequently, the
Pennsylvania State Bar Association should amend their guidance to alert at-
torneys as to whether or not speech in e-mails is open to disciplinary attack.
The New York State Bar Association also issued a warning to its attor-
neys regarding online speech. Specifically, the Association warned of the
inability for Facebook users to know who has viewed their profile.203 This
warning is significant because an attorney may think he or she has put his or
her profile on appropriate privacy settings, but if the attorney did not fully
protect the account then an individual could see the content and the attorney
would not know.
The Association gave two examples in which attorneys' speech made on
the Internet resulted in disciplinary action.204 Robert Heverly wrote on behalf
of the Association, "in the first case, an attorney handling a wrongful death
case sent a picture of the dead body to a friend and included disparaging
remarks. As the firm monitored e-mail, his firm saw the message and re-
ported him to the disciplinary authorities."205 Thus, lawyers in New York
possess sound guidance as to the potential for disciplinary action stemming
from speech made not only on the Internet but also in seemingly private
forms of communication like e-mail. Additionally, this lack of information
may extend to other social media platforms. For attorneys who wish to post
information on a social media platform, they should be aware of both the
privacy settings and the general function of the platform. Heverly pointed
out, "fully understanding how a particular technology platform works is criti-
cal to the situation. Despite repeated appearances of claims to the contrary on
201. Ethical Obligations for Attorneys Using Social Media: Formal Opinion 2014-
300, PA. BAR Ass'N 2, https://www.pabar.org/members/catalogs/Ethics%20
Opinions/formal/F2014-300.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).
202. See id.
203. Robert Heverly, The Law and Ethics of Social Networking & Online Activity,
NY STATE BAR Ass'N 20, http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.
aspx?id=44239 (last visited Aug. 30, 2016).




Facebook, Facebook users are not aware when someone has viewed their
public profile pages."206
While the above examples show that adequate information about speak-
ing on the Internet can be disseminated to individuals and attorneys, this does
not provide sufficient education to attorneys as a whole. For the attorneys
sanctioned for their online speech, the individual searches of the state bar
associations' websites did not produce robust resources to determine the ethi-
cal implications of Internet speech. Embedded in this issue of attorney online
speech is the potential clash of the ABA Model Rules and the First Amend-
ment. Attorneys may think they can simply speak their minds about the judi-
ciary without fear of retribution; however, state bar associations can, and do,
punish lawyers for impugning the judiciary. Therefore, state bar associations
may have to work with their members to construct more speech-friendly poli-
cies. The associations strive to protect the integrity of the profession and the
judiciary through policing attorney speech-both offline and online. As such,
the state bar associations should offer more information to attorneys about
the ramifications of speaking on the Internet.
V. CONCLUSION
Attorneys spend their careers speaking, and so they must pay close at-
tention to the rules that govern what they can and cannot say. The ABA
Model Rules serve as the baseline for understanding the restraints on attorney
speech-whether that speech relates to clients, work, or judges. Attorney
speech about judges, however, deserves special consideration because of the
First Amendment implications inherent in rules that constrain or bar speech
that impugns the judiciary. While one argument in favor of regulating that
type of speech is to protect the public's confidence and view of the judiciary,
an argument against regulation is that the public deserves to hear about judi-
cial impropriety. Although attorneys may air their grievances against judges
through the formal process of filing a complaint, this should not be the only
forum in which attorneys can express frustration or despair about the judici-
ary. Elected judges in particular should be held accountable by the people
they govern. As it stands, however, lawyers must submit to the rules that
govern their profession and so they must remain vigilant about the words
they speak and write.
In light of the constraints surrounding attorney speech directed at or
relating to the judiciary, reviewing courts have developed two main methods
to review state disciplinary committees' decisions on attorney disciplinary
matters. Many courts apply the reasonable attorney standard to deduce
whether a reasonable attorney would say the same things as the attorney
under investigation. This standard contains few parameters and ultimately
emerges as undefined and perilously malleable in the hands of the court.
After all, courts must decide if a reasonable attorney would say impugning
206. .Id. at 20.
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remarks about the judiciary. The lack of objective removal in that type of
situation might lead to courts punishing lawyers out of sheer anger for certain
remarks-regardless of whether or not a reasonable attorney would or would
not say those things. Other courts, however, apply the more flexible Sullivan
standard, which focuses on the truth or falsity of the speech in question.207
This approach allows courts to inquire as to whether or not the attorney pur-
posefully spread false information about the judiciary. Under this standard,
attorneys can still say critical remarks about the judiciary and not fear the
wrath of an offended court. The differences between the two standards ap-
pear to result in differing degrees of punishment for attomeys-with the rea-
sonable attorney standard resulting in harsher punishments than the Sullivan
standard. However, courts remain divided on the choice between the two
standards, and attorneys need to research their jurisdiction to learn the stan-
dard to which courts will hold them.
Analyzing this restraint on attorney speech as applied to the very popu-
lar form of speech today-the Internet-results in the emergence of unique
cases in which attorneys speak in public and private fashions and suffer dis-
ciplinary consequences for that speech. Attorneys who speak on social media
websites should not expect any privacy protections for their speech. Even
though such websites may contain privacy features, attorneys should know
that often those privacy features do not work correctly, attorneys may not
understand the features fully, or individuals may access the content through
other means. This type of approach to Internet speech may be intuitive for
some and wholly unknown and foreign to others. As such, state bar associa-
tions owe attorneys proper guidance on both the perils and benefits of In-
temet speech. A brief review of state bar associations' websites, where
lawyers should find useful information, results in very little or no useful in-
formation regarding Internet speech.
Additionally, some attorneys endure punishment for speech made
through more private Internet means such as e-mail. This level of intrusion
into e-mail contents represents a disturbing show of power by the discipli-
nary committees and reviewing courts. On its face, this type of regulation
seems overbearing and unwarranted. Lawyers must possess the right to gripe
about others, including judges, in confidence. While state bar associations
will likely not prosecute a lawyer for simple griping, the fact remains that
they possess the power to bring disciplinary charges against attorneys for
impugning the judiciary. It is unclear where the state bar associations draw
the line between griping and impugning; however, for an attorney in a rea-
sonable attorney jurisdiction, that line may be closer to griping than one
might expect.
Attorneys owe respect to their profession and the judiciary before whom
they practice. They also possess, however, the right to speak about the judici-
ary in a candid and forthright manner. While state bar associations, discipli-
nary committees, and reviewing courts attempt to keep lawyers' speech in
207. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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line to protect the public's confidence in the judicial system and to protect
judges from unwarranted attacks, these associations could do more to educate
lawyers on the potential consequences of making Internet comments about
the judiciary. Preparing and making available easy-to-access information on
their websites about the ethical issues surrounding online speech would give
attorneys notice about both the type of standard applied in their jurisdiction
to disciplinary cases and the permissible limits of communicating informa-
tion on the Internet.
Now that you understand the nuances of speaking ill about the judiciary,
would you send that letter airing your frustrations about the judge over the
Internet? If you are a reasonable attorney, perhaps you should think twice.

